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Abstract 
This paper used computer simulation to test the effectiveness of nine different 
presidential selection methods in generating executive-legislative conflict. Interest group ratings 
from the 101st Congress are used to simulate presidential nominees selected under both partisan 
and non-partisan methods. Three measures of ideological conflict for liberalism, conservatism, 
and the average ideological difference of the two 
are calculated between the simulated presidents 
and each member of Congress, and then averaged across all members of Congress. Through 
senstitivity analysis, the 
current method of selection which sequences partisan primaries in 
small states first in the process is found to result in the most executive-legislative conflict of 
all the methods examined. Nonpartisan methods generally result in less conflict than their 
partisan counterparts, although reductions in conflict may be achieved with the adoption of 
certain partisan selection options. 
Sources of Executive-Legislative Conflict 
The separation of powers and checks and balances structure instituted by 
the Founders in the U.S. Constitution is an "invitation to struggle," especially 
between the executive and legislative branches of government (Fisher 1985). The 
Founders' intent was to promote compromise and accommodation, but their inven 
tion also produces hostility and divided government. Power shifts and turf battles 
between the presidency and Congress are a staple feature of American politics, making 
conflict inevitable. Loose party labels, issues or triggering events, and personalities 
combined with the decentralized structure make for a lethal cocktail (Davidson, 1988). 
The relationship between Congress and the president has also been characterized as 
"two on a seesaw," so that when one is up, the other is down (Hogan, 1985: 127). 
Internal power fluctuations and intervening factors further complicate the ebb and 
flow of power between the two branches (Davidson, 1988: 20). 
Much tension is generated between these two branches particularly when one 
part occupies the presidency and another party dominates Congress. Even without 
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this precondition, battles for supremacy on agenda-setting and over legislative pro 
grams occur as the President and the 535 members of Congress may have different 
attitudes toward national policy and the directions it should take (Edwards, 1980, 
1989). Partisan conflict merely reinforces and intensifies natural institutional rivalries 
and policy preference differences (Pfiffner, 1991; Whicker and Moore, 1988: 7; 
Light, 1983). 
Presidential popularity, the level of party factionalism, the ability of majority 
presidents to exert control over the committee system in Congress, the cohesion 
of the loyal opposition and the ability of presidents to capitalize on crosss-pressured 
representatives in order to build supportive coalitions affect executive-legislative 
relations and the probability of conflict (Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Gilbert, 1989; 
Pritchard, 1986; Rivers and Rose, 1985; Sullivan, 1988; Bond and Fleisher, 1984; 
Covington, 1988; Kerbel, 1989; Gribbin, 1989). Presidential ambitions and agendas 
have also been linked to legislative success of White House proposals (Forshee and 
Renka, 1991). 
One source of potential conflict between presidents and members of Congress 
lies in the different constituencies to whom each must appeal. Fenno (1978) has 
shown the significant impact member perceptions of their own constituencies can 
have on the actions of members of Congress and how members may have several 
different constituencies at any point in time. Whicker and Moore (1988) have identi 
fied key "constituent" audiences to whom successful presidents must listen and whom 
they must persuade. Yet differences in selection methods may also result in presidents 
who survived the approval of different geographic and party constituents. Surviving 
presidential contenders under various selection methods may assume, or at least 
closely approximate the views of key constituencies who dominated their selection 
process. Thus, the views and ideological leanings of key "gatekeeper" constituencies 
under various selection methods may also be a source of conflict between the president 
who adopts them to become elected and members of Congress. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine presidential-congressional conflict 
generated by different geographical and party constituencies on whom presidents 
might depend under various selection methods. Given the "deadlock of democracy" 
viewed with alarm by some scholars (Burns, 1963), methods which produce less 
probable conflict, ceteris paribus, are preferred. Since the method of presidential 
selection is not varied at any point in time, and has varied only incrementally across 
time, a deductive simulation approach using sensitivity testing will be used. 
Presidential Selection Methods 
Numerous methods for selecting the nation's chief executive have been 
suggested, from the times of the Founders to the present. Among them are the 
direct vote plan which eliminates the electoral college, and the district system which 
parallels congressional structure by allocating a single electoral vote to each congres 
sional district to be cast in accordance with the majority popular vote within each 
district, and two additional electoral votes to each state to be cast according to 
statewide popular votes. A proposed proportional plan would retain the current 
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apportionment of electors based on representatives and senators in Congress but 
would allow each state to cast its electoral votes in blocks for different candidates 
in proportion to the popular vote each candidate received within the state. The 
automatic system plan is actually not 
a separate plan but is compatible with one of 
the first three; it would restrict any discretion of electors to deviate from the popular 
vote (Peirce and Longley, 1981; Sayre and Parris, 1970; Matthews, 1973). 
While many of these plans have been the subject of great scholarly debate, 
they have not been given serious political attention nor placed 
on the national agenda 
in recent decades. Thus this analysis explores a more limited range of presidential 
options, some of which have been seriously considered 
or have been tried by one 
or both parties in recent elections. The presidential selection methods considered 
here are: the direct partisan national primary; the regional partisan primary; the 
regional nonpartisan primary; and sequencing of state primaries under both partisan 
and nonpartisan primaries to emphasis large states early in the selection process. The 
current process which emphasizes small atypical states (New Hampshire and Iowa) 
early in the nomination phase of presidential selection will also be considered under 
both partisan and nonpartisan conditions. These selection methods will be compared 
using simulation and sensitivity analysis applied to data from the 101st Congress 
to determine the likely impact of presidential selection method on potential executive 
legislative conflict. 
Partisan State Primaries, Small States First 
Under the current system of selecting presidential nominees, some but 
not all states have primaries. Reforms which began in the late sixties resulted in 
the spread of primaries. The Democrats held seventeen primaries in 1968 while the 
Republicans held sixteen. In 1988, however, the number of primaries increased 
to 
38 overall for both parties (Nelson, 1989; Crotty, 1985). 
Traditionally, the first state to conduct a presidential primary in a presidential 
election year has been New Hampshire. In recent elections, the role of New Hamp 
shire as the first indicator of presidential candidate appeal has been overtaken by the 
presidential caucuses in Iowa. Proponents of the current system argue that it protects 
minorities, allowing them to wield influence by using significant blocs of electoral 
votes within a state. It recognizes the role of states as important political units and 
requires that Presidents obtain a geographically broad constituency. Critics have 
argued that the system is complicated and inconsistent since states 
are allowed to 
choose electors differently. Also, great attention is focused on atypical smaller, less 
populous states in the early days of 
a presidential campaign which limits the field 
of candidates to those who evidence appeal to a relatively homogeneous set of voters 
in those small states (Berman, 1987). Partisan constituencies in small states limit 
presidential candidates 
even further in their ability to articulate views appealing to 
diverse audiences. 
Partisan State Primaries, Large States First 
To counter the early impact of New Hampshire and Iowa in limiting 
the initial field of presidential contenders, some proponents of change have advocated 
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altering the sequence of state partisan primaries to place large states earlier in the 
selection process. Proponents argue this method would retain much of the flexibility 
of the current system but would force presidential candidates surviving early stages 
of the electoral process to be more representative of the entire nation. In particular, 
Democrats in California, a large heterogenous state with over one-tenth of the entire 
national electorate, have considered moving their primary to the early phases of the 
process. Party officials in other large states could consider such sequence changes as 
well. 
Partisan Home State Primaries of Presidential Hopefuls 
One variation on the current system is the early sequencing of state partisan 
primaries which are the home states of presidential hopefuls and favorite sons. This 
would allow home state candidates to appeal initially to constituencies with which 
they have the greatest familarity and likely the greatest compatibility. 
Nonpartisan State Primaries, Small States First 
Nonpartisan state primaries provide an option to partisan state primaries. 
States that do not have party registration in essence move toward nonpartisan pri 
maries by allowing any voter to participate in any primary. Sequencing small states 
first with this option, however, restricts initial candidate constituencies to more 
homogeneous audiences, although not as homogeneous as partisan primaries in small 
states. 
Nonpartisan State Primaries, Large States First 
Nonpartisan primaries may also be conducted initially in large states. 
By virtue of state size, initial candidate constituencies are likely somewhat more 
representative of the whole nation than are small state primaries. The nonpartisan 
character further broadens initial constituency bases. 
Regional Partisan Primaries 
Various regional primary plans have been proposed which could possibly 
lessen the role of individual states. One regional partisan primary plan, the M?ndale 
Plan, divides the nation into six regions and sequences primaries in two-week intervals 
within these regions from the end of March until the beginning of June. States are 
encouraged to hold closed primaries to unify and strengthen parties. This plan retains 
the national party convention and tries to strengthen the role of political parties in 
the process. 
Proponents of regional partisan primaries believe that they could reduce the 
disproportionate impact of small, idiosyncratic early state primaries. Order of regional 
primaries could be rotated to prevent any long term impact of early regional primaries. 
Opponents argue that forced national campaigns produce less grassroots campaigning 
and generate longer periods of fundraising activity (Crotty and Jackson, 1985: 226 
228). 
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Regional Nonpartisan Primaries 
Nonpartisan regional primaries are a possibility, although not particularly 
popular. Under such a method, party registration would not restrict the primary 
in which voters participated. Under the Packwood Plan, five regions are specified. 
Within each region, each state would hold its primary or caucus on the same date. 
The dates are staggered with one primary per month starting in March and ending 
in July. Candidates receive direct votes and delegate votes are apportioned to candi 
dates in proportion to candidate strength in each state. All voters in all regions are 
allowed to choose among all candidates (Crotty and Jackson, 1985). 
Proponents argue such a method would increase candidate representativeness. 
If this system was augmented by open primaries, which many states now have, 
however, party elite control of the selection process would be weakened. Critics 
argue that weakening the party system is undesirable and that such a schema still 
allows front loading where smaller, less populous states would occasionally be in 
the leading regions by the luck of the draw in some election years (Polsby and 
Wildavsky, 1984). 
National Partisan Primaries 
National partisan primaries are another alternative method for winnowing 
out presidential candidates. The most common proposal allows Congress to designate 
a national primary election day for each political party. Primaries are then opened 
only to party members and candidates who qualify only if they file petitions in 
seventeen states and gather signatures which amount to one percent of the state's 
vote in the previous election. If no single candidate receives forty percent of the 
vote, a runoff is held shortly. National conventions would be held primarily to select 
a vice president, finalize party platforms and conduct other party activities. Other 
variations of the national partisan primary have been suggested (Crotty and Jackson, 
1985). 
By abolishing all state primaries, national partisan primaries nationalize elec 
tions, lessen the piecemeal nature of the current selection process and reduce the 
length of presidential campaigns. This process might diminish the disproportionate 
impact any single state or region would exert under many other primary systems. 
At the same time, critics argue that nationwide challengers need a large war chest 
of funds at the beginning to enhance their name recognition. They also contend 
that national partisan primaries weaken the party system, encourage personalistic 
campaigns and give rise to demagogic candidacies who have little to lose by making 
unrealistic promises or by stirring up mass hatreds (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1984). 
National Nonpartisan Primary 
A national nonpartisan primary would be the equivalent of a multicandi 
date general election popular vote, if candidates from both political parties ran. Such 
a method would likely force candidates to adopt moderate views closely aligned 
with the national average, but may result in a plurality rather than a majority, 
forcing a runoff. 
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Data and Research Questions 
The remainder of this paper explores through computer simulation and 
sensitivity testing with empirical evidence the ramifications of various approaches 
to presidential selection. Various scholars have generally supported the notion that 
members of Congress vote in accordance with the views of their constituencies, 
particularly on salient visible issues (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Powell, 1982; and 
Erikson, 1978). Interest group ratings of Congress members have been used as 
measures of state ideology, despite obvious limitations, to reflect ideologies of mem 
bers from various states, regions, and partisan constituencies (Holbrook-Provow and 
Poe, 1987; Rabinowitz et al., 1984). 
Interest group ratings are particularly appropriate for this study, since our 
primary focus is upon executive-legislative conflict. The ratings represent the ideolog 
ical views of various members of Congress. We simulated various presidential candi 
dates representative of different geographic constituencies by assuming that interest 
group ratings also were representative of the views of the appropriate constituency 
being modeled. We took ten interest group ratings per member from Barone and 
Ujifitsa (1990) for all U.S. representatives and Senators, for the 101st Congress. 
When a member was newly elected with no ratings, the ratings of the predecessor 
were used. These ratings all ranged from 0 to 10 and represent the percentage of 
time a member voted in accordance with a group's position on issues of concern to 
the group. 
Simulated presidents under various selection methods were assigned ideologies 
equivalent to the region, state, or party constituency that dominated their selection 
process. Absolute differences between these simulated presidential ideologies and 
each member of each House were then computed and averaged to gain an overall 
measure of conflict with each house for simulated presidents selected under various 
options. All members from a state delgation from both House and Senate were used 
to calculate average state ideology for nonpartisan analyses* All members from a 
state's partisan delegation from both House and Senate were used to calculate averages 
for partisan state primaries. A similar approach was used for nonpartisan and partisan 
regional primaries. 
Five liberal ratings and five conservative ratings were used. The five liberal 
ratings reflected various dimensions of liberalism: ADA (inequality and civil rights); 
ACLU (free speech and civil liberties); COPE (labor issues); CFA (consumer issues); 
and LCV (environmental issues). A mean of these five ratings was calculated to 
form an overall liberalism index (LIB). 
The five conservative ratings also reflected various dimensions of conservatism: 
ACU (budget and foreign policy issues); NTLC (resistance to taxes and government 
spending); NSI (national security issues); COC (established business interests); and 
CEI (free enterprise positions). As with the five liberal ratings, a mean of these five 
conservative ratings was also calculated to form an overall conservatism index (CON). 
In general, an inverse relationship was expected between the LIB and CON 
indices, although due to the myriad of issues rated in the various indices and the 
complexity of issue space, the relationship was not expected to be monotonie (mono 
tonic would imply conservatism increased, liberalism would automatically decrease, 
and vice versa). Thus, both liberal and conservative indices are reported for all regions 
and states. 
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TABLE 1 
Ideology in Congress by Party 
ADA ACLU COPE CFA LCV LIB 
House: 
Democrat 
Republican 
All members 
Dem-Rep 
Senate: 
Democrat 
Republican 
AH members 
Dem-Rep 
74.5 
20.4 
52.9 
54.1 
71.1 
19.7 
47.5 
51.4 
72.6 
27.7 
54.7 
44.9 
62.4 
28.5 
46.8 
33.9 
79.6 
22.4 
56.7 
57.2 
79.1 
22.9 
53.3 
56.2 
77.8 
42.0 
63.5 
35.8 
87.1 
40.7 
65.8 
46.4 
66.0 
35.2 
53.7 
30.8 
56.9 
37.8 
48.1 
19.1 
74.1 
29.5 
56.3 
44.6 
71.3 
29.9 
52.3 
41.4 
ACU NTLC NSI COC CEI CON 
House: 
Democrat 
Republican 
All members 
Rep-Dem 
Senate: 
Democrat 
Republican 
All members 
Rep-Dem 
19.0 
79.3 
43.1 
60.3 
18.7 
74.9 
44.6 
56.2 
17.8 
69.1 
38.3 
51.3 
17.2 
64.7 
39.1 
47.5 
27.6 
91.2 
53.0 
63.6 
30.0 
83.9 
54.8 
53.9 
37.3 
85.4 
56.5 
48.1 
37.3 
76.8 
55.5 
39.5 
18.0 
59.0 
34.4 
41.0 
18.4 
53.7 
34.7 
35.3 
23.9 
76.8 
45.1 
52.9 
24.3 
70.8 
45.7 
46.6 
Ideology by Party 
If political parties differ in ideological approaches to public issues, then 
party differences will impact upon partisan presidential primaries. Presidents from 
one party will have greater potential conflict with Congress when one or more 
houses are dominated by the opposing political party. 
Despite complaints about the American political parties as being similar, and 
predictions by Downs (1957) and others that political parties in a two-party single 
member district system of representation where opinion is predominantly unimodal 
will be adjacent and moderate on their issue stances on a left-right ideological con 
tinuum, considerable differences occur across parties in the 101st Congress. (See 
Table 1). 
Parties in the House differ by more than thirty percentage points on all the 
liberal interest group ratings. The differences by party on ADA and COPE exceed 
fifty points, while the differences on ACLU approach fifty points. In each instance^ 
the Democrats are more liberal than the Republicans. On the overall liberal index, 
House Democrats score 74.1, while House Republicans score 29.5, a difference of 
44.6 points. This represents considerable ideological difference between the two 
parties within Congress. The Senate pattern for liberalism measures varies slightly 
from House scores but basically represents a similar pattern. The overall Senate liberal 
index for Democrats (71.1) exceeds the overall Republican index (29.9) by 41.4 
points. 
An examination of conservative interest group ratings for House and Senate 
likewise reveal significant ideological differences both on individual ratings and the 
overall conservative index. On overall conservatism, House Republicans (76.8) exceed 
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TABLE 2 
Ideology in Congress by Region 
ADA ACLU COPE CFA LCV LIB 
House: 
New England 
Industrial Belt 
South 
Farm Belt 
West 
All members 
High-Low 
Senate: 
New England 
Industrial Belt 
South 
Farm Belt 
West 
All members 
High-Low 
74.8 H 
59.3 
40.9 L 
52.9 
52.2 
52.9 
33.9 
70.0 H 
59.8 
36.0 L 
42.1 
41.3 
47.5 
34.0 
72.0 H 
61.0 
42.5 L 
54.3 
56.1 
54.7 
29.5 
67.6 H 
56.8 
34.7 L 
44.1 
42.8 
46.8 
32.9 
73.3 H 
66.1 
46.9 L 
49.8 
52.6 
56.7 
27.3 
65.5 H 
68.5 
46.4 
49.1 
43.6 L 
53.3 
21.9 
76.1 H 
71.2 
55.7 L 
58.5 
58.6 
63.5 
20.4 
78.1 H 
77.3 
60.7 
63.4 
56.8 L 
65.8 
21.3 
77.2 H 
59.7 
40.9 L 
61.6 
51.8 
53.7 
36.3 
76.5 H 
58.6 
31.3 L 
48.5 
43.4 
48.1 
45.2 
74.7 H 
63.4 
45.2 L 
55.4 
54.2 
56.3 
29.5 
71.6 H 
64.2 
41.8 L 
49.5 
45.6 
52.3 
29.8 
ACU NTLC NSI COC CEI CON 
House: 
New England 
Industrial Belt 
South 
Farm Belt 
West 
All members 
High-Low 
Senate: 
New England 
Industrial Belt 
South 
Farm Belt 
West 
All members 
High-Low 
22.4 L 
35.6 
55.5 H 
44.5 
44.3 
43.1 
33.1 
23.4 L 
30.1 
54.4 H 
52.3 
52.3 
44.6 
31.0 
32.0 L 
33.5 
40.0 
49.4 H 
42.4 
38.3 
17.4 
30.9 
25.8 L 
41.0 
46.2 
48.5 H 
39.1 
22.7 
24.4 L 
45.5 
71.3 H 
48.1 
50.1 
53.0 
46.9 
30.1 L 
40.0 
71.9 H 
55.0 
61.0 
54.8 
41.8 
42.0 L 
51.0 
63.7 H 
61.6 
58.5 
56.5 
21.7 
47.7 
46.6 L 
59.3 
58.4 
61.1 H 
55.5 
14.5 
25.8 L 
29.0 
38.0 
40.0 H 
39.2 
34.4 
14.2 
26.0 
23.5 L 
35.5 
39.3 
44.8 H 
34.7 
21.3 
29.3 L 
38.9 
53.7 H 
48.7 
47.0 
45.1 
24.4 
31.6 L 
33.2 
52.4 
50.2 
53.6 H 
45.7 
22.0 
House Democrats (23.9) by 52.9 points, while Senate Republicans (70.8) exceed 
Senate Democrats (24.3) by 46.6 points. While considerable variation exists within 
parties, as much literature about the lack of party accountability has illustrated, 
considerable ideological differences between parties do exist. 
Ideology by Region 
Do significant ideological differences persist across regions? If the answer 
is yes, then presidential candidates from different regions will exhibit different perspec 
tives on national issues. Further, national tickets must be constructed to appeal to 
different ideological perspectives that vary by region. Table 2 examines this question. 
Similar patterns for the House and Senate emerge by region, further bolstering 
our assumption that presidential candidates will reflect the ideological perspectives 
of the geographic constituencies from which they are selected. When House overall 
liberalism is examined, New England, the most liberal region (74.7) exceeds the 
South, the least liberal (45.2) by 29.5 points. The second most liberal region, the 
THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION METHODS 753 
TABLE 3 
Ideology by Region, Party, and Chamber 
Region 
House 
LIB CON LIB 
Senate 
CON 
New England 
Democrat 
Republican 
Party difference 
Industrial Belt 
Democrat 
Republican 
Party difference 
South 
Democrat 
Republican 
Party difference 
Farm Belt 
Democrat 
Republican 
Party difference 
West 
Democrat 
Republican 
Party difference 
All members 
Democrat 
Republican 
Party difference 
74.7 
85.5 
55.5 
29.7 
63.4 
80.1 
37.6 
42.5 
45.2 
59.7 
20.0 
39.7 
55.4 
77.5 
31.9 
45.6 
54.2 
81.4 
20.6 
60.8 
56.3 
74.1 
29.5 
44.6 
29.3 
12.8 
58.8 
46.0 
38.9 
18.0 
71.3 
53.3 
53.7 
36.8 
83.1 
60.0 
48.7 
23.1 
75.9 
52.8 
47.0 
18.0 
82.9 
64.9 
45.1 
23.9 
76.8 
52.9 
71.6 
88.6 
51.1 
37.5 
64.2 
78.0 
42.7 
35.3 
41.8 
59.2 
13.9 
45.3 
49.5 
66.1 
32.8 
33.3 
45.6 
74.3 
24.5 
49.8 
52.3 
71.3 
29.9 
41.4 
31.6 
11.6 
55.6 
44.0 
33.2 
17.4 
57.8 
40.4 
52.4 
32.7 
83.9 
51.2 
50.2 
32.5 
67.9 
35.4 
53.6 
22.6 
76.2 
53.6 
45.7 
24.3 
70.8 
46.5 
Industrial Belt (63.4), is followed by the Farm Belt (55.4) and the West (54.2). By 
region, Senate overall liberalism is slightly less than in the House: New England 
(71.6), Industrial Belt (66.2), Farm Belt (49.5), West (45.6), and South (41.8). The 
liberalism gap between New England and the South is 29.8. 
Similar rankings are obtained when examining the overall conservatism index 
by region for the House, with the Farm Belt and West shifting positions in the 
House, and the South and the West shifting in the Senate. Conservatism in the 
House ranges from 29.3 for New England to 53.7 for the South, a gap of 24.4 
points. The conservatism range in the Senate is from 
a low of 31.6 for New England 
to 53.6 in the West, a gap of 22.0. With a ranking of 52.4, the South barely trails 
the West in conservatism in the Senate. 
Ideology by Region and Party in the House and Senate 
National tickets must appeal to various regional ideological biases once 
nominated, but must also appeal to party biases within regions to be nominated. 
Considerable variation exists within regions as well as across them. Tables 3 and 4 
examine party biases across regions. 
As Table 3 indicates, in the House, the least difference between parties within 
a region occurs in New England where both Democrats and Republicans are compara 
tively liberal. The party difference on libealism in New England is 29.7, while 
on 
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conservatism, it is 46.0, the lowest for all regions. The fact that Republicans in 
this region are more liberal than the overall national average for both parties, and 
less conservative than the overall average illustrates why New England Republicans 
have played a very limited role in nomination politics for national tickets in recent 
elections. 
In Table 3 in the House, the greatest differences between parties on both 
liberalism (60.8) and conservatism (64.9) occur in the West, where Democrats are 
very liberal, and Republicans are very conservative. This suggests the problem for 
a national ticket of striking an ideological balance between competing party interests 
will be particularly challenging in the West. A similarly challenging problem exists 
for national tickets addressing conservative issues in the South, where the party 
difference between Republicans and Democrats is great (60.0). 
Similar results pertaining to the West are found in the Senate. As in the House, 
in the Senate the biggest gap between Democrats and Republicans occurs in the 
West for both liberalism (49.8) and conservatism (53.6). Unlike the House, however, 
where the smallest ideological differences on both liberalism and conservatism occur 
in New England, the smallest differences on both indices in the Senate occur in the 
Farm Belt. 
Ideology In Congress By State 
Table 4 displays the overall average liberalism and conservatism indices for 
House members in individual states within the various regions as well as their electoral 
votes. The Industrial Belt contains the largest number of electoral votes, followed 
by the South and West. New England and the Farm Belt together do not contain 
as many electoral votes as the West, the third ranking region. (See Table 4). 
Again, considerable variation in liberalism and conservatism exists within re 
gions by state. In New England, New Hampshire plainly stands out from other 
more liberal states as being conservative (26.6 on liberalism and 88.1 on conservatism). 
Within the Industrial Belt, Delaware ranks highest on the liberalism index (78.0), 
but West Virginia (72.1) ranks second, as well as lowest on the conservatism index 
(20.8). Ohio is the most conservative state in the Industrial Belt (48.6), followed 
by Indiana (44.7) and Pennsylvania (44.4). In the Farm Belt, the Dakotas are some 
what more liberal than other states (ND 74.0, SD 72.8), while Nebraska (75.9) is 
the most conservative. 
In the South, rankings for liberalism and conservatism are not exactly mirror 
images, reflecting populist strains within the region. Arkansas (55.1) is the most 
liberal state, closely followed by North Carolina (54.2) and South Carolina (53.5). 
Louisiana is the least liberal (33.1), followed by Alabama (39.7), Virginia (41.3), 
and Texas (42.1). Louisiana (65.0) ranks highest in the South on conservatism, 
followed by Alabama (63.8) and Virginia (60.0). In contrast to popular myth, Missis 
sippi ranked least conservative among southern states (41.4). 
In the West, Wyoming stands out from other states as the most conservative. 
It ranks lowest on liberalism (7.8) and highest on conservatism (89.6). Washington 
(69.3) is the most liberal, but Hawaii is the least conservative (32.6). California, 
with its powerful block of electroal votes (47) ranks slightly above the national 
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TABLE 4 
Ideology in House by State 
State LIB CON 
Electoral 
Votes State LIB CON 
Electoral 
Votes 
New England 
CT 
ME 
MA 
NH 
Rl 
VT 
High-Low 
Industrial Belt 
DE 
IL 
IN 
MD 
Ml 
MO 
NJ 
NY 
OH 
PA 
WV 
High-Low 
Farm Belt 
IA 
KS 
MN 
NE 
ND 
SD 
Wl 
High-Low 
74.7 
77.8 
78.4 
86.8 H 
26.6 L 
77.4 
60.0 
60.2 
63.4 
78.0 H 
57.0 
57.1 
73.3 
70.0 
53.7 L 
70.3 
69.8 
54.3 
58.4 
72.1 
24.3 
55.4 
54.2 
41.4 
63.8 
26.9 L 
74.0 H 
72.8 
62.0 
47.1 
29.3 
35.3 
30.4 
11.2 L 
88.1 H 
23.4 
29.2 
76.9 
29.3 
37.0 
42.7 
44.7 
31.9 
33.7 
46.6 
34.6 
32.8 
48.6 H 
44.4 
20.8 L 
27.8 
48.7 
51.6 
62.6 
41.9 
75.9 H 
25.0 
23.4 L 
41.4 
52.5 
36 
8 
4 
13 
4 
4 
3 
186 
3 
24 
12 
10 
20 
11 
16 
36 
23 
25 
6 
47 
8 
7 
10 
5 
3 
3 
11 
South 
AL 
AR 
FL 
GA 
KY 
LA 
MS 
NC 
OK 
SC 
TN 
TX 
VA 
High-Low 
West 
AK 
AZ 
CA 
CO 
Hl 
ID 
MT 
NV 
NM 
OR 
UT 
WA 
WY 
45.2 
39.7 
55.1 H 
46.0 
43.0 
47.7 
33.1 L 
45.1 
54.2 
48.2 
53.5 
49.6 
42.1 
41.3 
22.0 
54.2 
40.2 
25.4 
59.4 
51.8 
68.5 
32.9 
48.6 
46.0 
35.5 
58.3 
35.5 
69.3 H 37.0 
7.8 L 
53.7 
63.8 
43.5 
54.2 
55.6 
51.8 
65.0 H 
41.4 L 
46.9 
55.7 
52.5 
44.9 
54.2 
60.0 
23.6 
47.0 
60.2 
72.9 
41.1 
54.3 
32.6 L 
69.7 
43.9 
59.1 
57.3 
45.8 
67.6 
High-Low 61.5 
89.6 H 
57.0 
155 
9 
6 
21 
12 
9 
10 
7 
13 
8 
8 
11 
29 
12 
112 
3 
7 
47 
8 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
7 
5 
10 
3 
average of 56.3 on liberalism (59.4) and moderately below the national average of 
45.1 on conservatism (41.1). A California national candidate reflective of state values, 
then will cast a slightly liberal tenor to the ticket. 
Comparing across tables, we see that the greatest ideological gaps for single 
interest group ratings across regions are less than those across parties. The greatest 
gaps in the House are between New England and the South on the LCV liberal 
rating and the NSI conservative rating. The same pattern occurred in the Senate. 
The greatest partisan conflict occurred on both LIB and CON measures in the West, 
in both the House and the Senate. This indicates the West presents a particular 
challenge to national tickets, for the differences between political parties as reflected 
by representative voting in Congress is greatest in that region. 
Simulation Methodology and Sensitivity Testing 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the discrepancies between 
simulated presidents selected under various selection options. We attribute to each 
simulated president the average ideology for the region or party that is the basis for 
selecting that president. We then compare the simulated ideologies of the "president" 
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chosen by a particular selection method with the ideology of each of the 535 members 
of Congress. The combined discrepancy is our measure of probable executive-legisla 
tive conflict. We use three measures of ideological difference: LIBDIF measures the 
difference between the simulated president's liberal views and aggregated liberalism 
score of each member of Congress; CONDIF measures the difference between presi 
dential and congressional conservatism; IDDIF measures the average of the liberalism 
and conservatism differences, thus reflecting the average ideological conflict. 
If great discrepancies exist between a simulated president and members of 
Congress on ideological indices of liberalism and conservatism, then the method 
under which the president was selected has the potential for generating greater 
executive-legislative conflict. However, if only small discrepancies exist between a 
simulated president and members of Congress, then the method under which the 
president was selected has lower or little potential for generating executive-legislative 
conflict. 
Further, if we use a delegate model of representation and assume that members 
of Congress reflect the ideological perspectives of their geographic constituencies, 
then the presidential selection method that generates the least discrepancies between 
the simulated president and members of Congress results in 
a more representative 
president. Thus, from the viewpoint of democratic theory as well as easing executive 
legislative tensions, the option that represents the least discrepancy between leader 
ideology and constituent ideology is the most ideal. 
Tables 5 and 6 provide the results of the sensitivity testing employed in this 
analysis. For the current method of sequencing small states first, partisan and nonpar 
tisan averages of members of Congress for Iowa and New Hampshire were used to 
create a president selected under the current method where these states have a win 
nowing impact on the presidential nomination process. For the selection method 
of sequencing large state primaries first, partisan and nonpartisan large state averages 
were used for single large states in the same manner as the averages of Iowa and 
New Hampshire were used to generate simulated presidents limited by the need to 
appeal ideologically to those states. Additional states of current interest which have 
served as the home states of recent presidential hopefuls were also tested. 
For the method of regional partisan primaries, overall party averages for all 
members of Congress from each party from each region were used to generate 
simulated presidents selected from each of the five regions. For non-partisan regional 
primaries, the average ideological indices of all members of Congress in 
a particular 
region, regardless of party, were used to create simulated presidential nominees. For 
national partisan primaries, all party members in Congress regardless of region were 
averaged to create stimulated presidents. The national nonpartisan primary was 
simulated more to provide a base of comparison than as a realistic presidential selection 
option, since it approximates the abolition of the electoral college and general election 
outcomes. 
In each of these tables, the three measures of executive-legislative conflict dis 
cussed above (LIBDIF, CONDIF, and IDDIF) are provided for each sensitivity test 
under each selection method. For each of these three measures, the minimum possible 
score is 0, while the maximum possible discrepancy is 100. 
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Results 
When simulated presidents were compared to all members of Congress 
to derive ideological differences indicative of likely executive-legislative conflict under 
various presidential selection methods, the following results were obtained: 
Partisan State Primaries, Small States First 
The current sequencing of small states first in partisan results in the largest 
discrepancy between the ideology of the president and of members of Congress of 
any of the selection methods tested here. While the discrepancy and conflict between 
the president and Congress is smaller if Iowa is used as a major winnowing state 
early on as it currently is used, using New Hamphsire as a limiting state produces 
great executive-legislative conflict, and results in a president less representative of 
the nation than any other selection method. As Table 5 indicates, the average discrep 
ancy for a simulated president from New Hampshire and the House is 40.0 while 
equivalent discrepancy for the Senate is 40.0. This was among the highest discrepancies 
observed in the various sensitivity tests. 
Table 6 develops chamber means on the combined measure of executive-legisla 
tive conflict (IDDIF) for both chambers across the sensitivity tests run and reported 
in Table 6. The combined mean for overall conflict for both houses here is 36.0, 
ranking this option last among all the selection methods as creating the most execu 
tive-legislative conflict. 
Partisan State Primaries, Large States First 
Under this selection method, executive-legislative conflict as measured by 
IDDIF declines somewhat, especially compared to New Hampshire. For Democrats, 
Texas actually scores the lowest on the overall IDDIF for both chambers of the 
largest states in each region (28.2). Among other large states for Democrats, Florida 
scores even lower on mean presidential/congressional conflict (27.8). The combined 
average for this method for Democratic primaries in the ten largest states is 32.2. 
For Republicans, New York is the state that results in the lowest conflict 
(29.0) when the largest state in each of the five regions is examined. Among other 
large states, a simulated president assuming the views of Pennsylvania Republicans 
also generates relatively low conflict (30.4). 
A simulated president with the views of Texas Republicans, however, does 
not fare as well as a simulated president with the views of Texas Democrats. The 
combined measure of executive-legislative conflict for a Texas Republican president 
is 44.3, the highest of all sensitivity tests conducted. This implies Bush, a Texas 
Republican, would experience much more conflict with Congress than did Lyndon 
Johnson, a Texas Democrat, to the extent the views of each was similar to the 
views of fellow party members in Congress. Nor is the combined conflict mean for 
California Republicans particularly salutory, with relatively high score of 39.4. 
The combined average for Republican primaries in the ten largest states is 35.5. 
Simulated Republican presidents from the largest states experience 3.3 points more 
presidential-congressional conflict than do simulated Democratic presidents from the 
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TABLE 5 
Discrepancies between Members of Congress and 
Presidents Selected Under Various Options 
House Senate 
Option LIBDIF CONDIF IDDIF LIBDIF CONDIF IDDIF 
Both 
Chambers 
ID 
(1) Partisan state primaries, small states first 
Small states with current influence-Democrats 
IA 30.7 32.5 31.6 34.2 
NH 37.4 42.7 40.0 35.8 
Small states with current influence-Republicans 
IA 30.4 36.4 33.4 29.0 
NH 37.4 42.7 40.0 35.8 
(2) Partisan state primaries, large states first 
Largest state per region?Democrats 
MA 
NY 
TX 
Wl 
CA 
33.9 
31.7 
26.4 
31.9 
31.6 
Other large states-Democrats 
IL 28.5 
FL 26.3 
PA 28.1 
OH 30.0 
Ml 32.7 
Largest state per region-Republicans 
36.2 
33.6 
29.6 
33.3 
33.8 
32.3 
29.2 
32.3 
32.4 
35.4 
MA 
NY 
TX 
Wl 
CA 
31.1 
27.8 
45.3 
33.5 
39.2 
31.5 
31.0 
45.4 
38.3 
41.6 
39.5 
40.5 
33.3 
40.4 
34.5 
Other large states?Republicans 
IL 35.8 
FL 37.6 
PA 28.6 
OH 35.9 
Ml 28.6 
(3) Partisan home state primaries of presidential hopefuls 
Additional states with presidential hopefuls?Democrats 
35.0 
32.6 
28.0 
32.6 
32.7 
30.4 
27.8 
30.2 
31.2 
34.1 
31.3 
29.4 
45.3 
35.9 
40.4 
37.6 
39.1 
31.0 
38.1 
31.5 
37.5 
35.3 
27.6 
35.6 
35.4 
31.3 
27.3 
30.3 
32.7 
36.0 
33.4 
27.3 
42.2 
31.7 
36.7 
33.4 
35.2 
27.6 
33.4 
27.9 
32.1 
41.5 
35.3 
41.5 
36.5 
33.5 
28.9 
33.2 
33.8 
32.2 
28.3 
32.2 
32.3 
35.6 
31.0 
29.8 
44.4 
37.0 
40.4 
38.2 
39.1 
32.0 
39.2 
33.2 
AR 
GA 
MO 
NB 
NJ 
TN 
VA 
27.6 
26.9 
27.9 
32.4 
29.7 
26.6 
26.4 
30.1 
29.2 
31.1 
31.9 
31.8 
29.8 
28.9 
28.8 
28.1 
29.5 
32.2 
30.8 
28.2 
27.6 
28.5 
26.7 
30.4 
30.4 
32.4 
28.1 
26.7 
29.7 
27.9 
30.9 
30.5 
31.7 
29.4 
27.9 
33.1 
38.7 
32.2 
38.7 
37.0 
34.4 
28.3 
34.4 
34.6 
31.7 
27.8 
31.3 
32.5 
35.8 
32.2 
28.6 
43.3 
34.4 
38.5 
35.8 
37.1 
29.8 
36.3 
30.5 
29.1 
27.3 
30.7 
30.4 
32.0 
28.8 
27.3 
32.4 
39.4 
32.8 
39.4 
36.0 
33.5 
28.2 
33.5 
33.7 
31.1 
27.8 
30.8 
31.9 
35.0 
31.8 
29.0 
44.3 
35.2 
39.5 
36.7 
38.1 
30.4 
38.8 
31.0 
29.0 
27.7 
30.1 
31.3 
31.4 
28.5 
27.5 
Continued 
largest states. As Table 6 shows, the average across both parties for the twenty 
partisan primaries, both Democratic and Republican, in the ten largest states is 33.9, 
ranking this selection method sixth in total executive-legislative conflict. 
Partisan Home State Primaries of Presidential Hopefuls 
How much conflict results if presidential candidates are greatly shaped 
by the views of the partisan delegation in their home states? Several presidential 
hopefuls in previous presidential elections were from the largest states (Cuomo in 
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TABLE 5 continued 
Option 
House Senate 
(State/Region/Party) LIBDIF CONDIF IDDIF LIBDIF CONDIF IDDIF 
Both 
Chambers 
ID 
Additional states with presidential hopefuls-Republicans 
AZ 42.7 42.4 42.6 
IN 38.5 40.8 39.7 
SC 34.7 36.9 35.8 
(4) Nonpartisan state primaries, small 
Small states with current influence 
IA 26.6 30.7 28.7 
NH 37.4 42.7 40.0 
(5) Nonpartisan state primaries, large 
Largest state per region 
39.9 
35.9 
32.3 
states first 
26.9 
35.8 
states first 
MA 
NY 
TX 
Wl 
CA 
Other large states 
IL 
FL 
PA 
OH 
Ml 
33.5 
26.8 
29.5 
29.7 
26.3 
26.2 
28.2 
26.2 
26.3 
27.2 
35.6 
29.1 
30.4 
29.9 
29.3 
29.1 
30.5 
29.0 
29.4 
29.3 
34.5 
27.9 
30.0 
28.3 
27.8 
27.7 
29.4 
27.6 
27.8 
28.3 
(6) Regional partisan primaries 
Democrats 
NE 
IB 
S 
FB 
W 
Republicans 
NE 
IB 
S 
FB 
W 
Region 
NE 
IB 
S 
FB 
W 
Party 
Democratic 
Republican 
32.9 
29.5 
26.2 
27.7 
29.6 
27.5 
30.2 
39.8 
32.8 
38.0 
34.8 
32.4 
29.0 
30.2 
32.0 
31.6 
34.5 
40.9 
36.7 
40.0 
33.8 
31.0 
27.6 
29.0 
30.8 
29.5 
32.4 
40.3 
34.8 
39.0 
(7) Regional nonpartisan primaries 
28.0 
26.1 
28.3 
26.8 
26.8 
29.7 
28.9 
30.0 
30.0 
29.9 
28.8 
27.5 
29.2 
28.4 
28.3 
(8) National partisan primaries 
27.6 30.5 29.0 
33.8 37.4 35.4 
(9) National nonpartisan primary 
27.3 29.3 27.8 
37.0 
28.8 
28.3 
27.8 
27.3 
26.8 
27.3 
26.8 
26.7 
29.3 
36.4 
32.4 
26.8 
30.3 
32.8 
28.0 
28.8 
37.1 
31.0 
35.5 
30.6 
27.4 
27.4 
27.2 
26.8 
29.9 
31.6 
26.8 
41.1 
39.7 
35.3 
29.8 
41.5 
35.8 
28.4 
29.1 
28.9 
28.4 
28.2 
29.1 
27.9 
28.3 
28.7 
34.9 
32.3 
28.0 
29.7 
31.7 
30.2 
33.0 
39.7 
35.4 
38.7 
29.1 
28.0 
28.8 
29.0 
28.7 
30.2 
35.6 
28.2 
40.5 
37.8 
33.8 
28.4 
38.7 
36.4 
28.6 
29.7 
28.3 
27.8 
27.5 
28.2 
27.4 
27.5 
29.0 
33.8 
32.3 
27.4 
30.0 
32.3 
29.1 
30.9 
38.4 
33.2 
37.1 
29.9 
27.7 
28.1 
28.1 
27.8 
30.0 
33.6 
27.5 
41.6 
38.8 
34.8 
28.6 
39.4 
35.5 
28.3 
20.0 
28.3 
27.8 
27.6 
28.8 
27.5 
27.7 
27.7 
33.8 
31.7 
27.5 
29.5 
31.6 
29.3 
31.7 
39.4 
34.0 
38.1 
29.4 
27.6 
28.7 
28.3 
28.1 
29.5 
34.5 
27.7 
New York; Jerry Brown in California; and John Kerry in Massachusetts for the 
Democrats; Pete Wilson in California and Bush in Texas for the Republicans). 
Additional moderate sized and smaller states were also tested here. States tested 
with Democratic hopefuls in previous elections include Arkansas (Bill Clinton), 
Georgia (Sam Nunn), Missouri (Richard Gephardt), Nebraska (Robert Kerrey), 
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TABLE 6 
Ranking of Presidential Selection Options by 
Executive-Legislative Conflict in Both Chambers 
Mean IDDIF 
Rank on Both House Senate 
Option Mean IDDIF Chambers IDDIF IDDIF 
National nonpartisan primary 1 27.7 27.8 27.5 
Regional nonpartisan primaries 2 28.4 28.4 28.3 
Nonpartisan state primaries, large states first 3 29.0 34.7 29.1 
National partisan primaries 4 32.0 32.2 32.0 
Regional partisan primaries 5 32.7 32.8 32.5 
Partisan state primaries, large states first 6 33.9 33.8 33.8 
Partisan primaries, home states of presidential hopefuls 7 33.9 32.5 33.4 
Nonpartisan state primaries, small states first 8 34.0 34.4 33.6 
Partisan state primaries, small states first 9 36.0 36.3 35.7 
New Jersey (Bill Bradley), Tennessee (Albert Gore), and Virginia (Doug Wilder 
and Chuck Robb). Additional states tested for the Republicans were Arizona (John 
McCain), Indiana (Dan Quayle), and South Carolina (Carroll Campbell). 
For Democrats from these moderate sized states, Virginia (27.5) and Georgia 
(27.7) experience slightly less conflict than others. The simulated president from 
Arkansas, Bill Clinton's home state, experienced slightly more conflict (28.8 in the 
House and 29.0 in the Senate, or an average of 28.9). The average for all Democratic 
candidates from moderate states is 29.4, actually somewhat better than the average 
for Democratic candidates from the largest states (32.2). For Republicans, however, 
the findings are the opposite. The average for Republican candidates from selected 
moderate or small states is 38.4, worse than the 35.5 average for Republicans from 
the largest states. The combined average for this approach across both parties is 
33.9, ranking this selection method seventh in total executive-legislative conflict 
generated. 
Nonpartisan State Primaries, Small States First 
If the small states that currently dominate the early phases of the presiden 
tial selection process used nonpartisan state primaries instead of partisan primaries 
and caucuses, 34.0 average combined conflict would result. This method ranks a 
poor showing of eighth in executive-legislative conflict. 
Nonpartisan State Primaries, Large States First 
Nonpartisan primaries in the ten largest primaries generate a mean conflict 
score of 29.0. This selection method produces a relatively good showing of ranking 
third among the approaches tested here. 
Regional Partisan Primaries 
For Democrats, the lowest combined presidential-congressional conflict 
results with the simulated president runs in a southern regional primary, adopting 
the average views of southern Democrats (27.5). For Republicans, the lowest conflict 
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results from a simulated Republican president running in a Northeastern regional 
primary. The Democratic conflict mean across all five regions (30.8) is somewhat 
lower than the Republican mean across all five regions (34.5), suggesting Democrats 
have more to gain in terms of lowering inter-branch conflict from partisan regional 
primaries than do Republians, and this is especially true if the southern regional 
primary begun with Super Tuesday is continued. Across parties, this method produces 
an average of 32.7 in conflict, ranking the method fifth in a field of nine selection 
methods. 
Regional Nonpartisan Primaries 
Regional nonpartisan primaries result in relatively low executive-legisla 
tive conflict for all regions, with the lowest conflict occuring in the industrial belt 
(27.6). The average across all regions is 28.4, ranking regional nonpartisan primaries 
second as a presidential selection method. 
National Partisan Primaries 
National partisan primaries work more to the favor of Democrats than 
Republicans. The combined mean across parties and houses for this approach is 32.0. 
This method ranks fourth in conflict. 
National Nonpartisan Primary 
A national nonpartisan primary is unlikely, since is approximates a general 
election. Plurality candidates would likely result, requiring run-offs. Nonetheless, 
a test of this approach provides a minimum standard against which the scores for 
presidential-congressional conflict generated by the other approaches can be com 
pared. The combined score across houses for this method is 27.7 ranking this option 
first, or the method with the lowest amount of conflict of the approaches tested. 
This indicates that even if a presidential candidate assumed the national average on 
each of the ten single ratings, a measure of 27.7 conflict with individual members 
would still result. 
Table 6 summarizes the findings for the nine presidential selection methods 
tested here, and ranks them from lowest to highest conflict. The national nonpartisan 
primary is ranked first, and provides the standard for judgment. Regional nonpartisan 
primaries and nonpartisan primaries in large states are ranked second and third. Thus, 
the top three ranks go to nonpartisan selection methods embracing broader geographic 
areas and more heterogeneous constituencies. 
National partisan primaries, regional partisan primaries, and partisan primaries 
in large states are ranked fourth, fifth and sixth, respectively, paralleling but trailing 
their nonpartisan counterparts. The method of partisan primaries in the home states 
of presidential hopefuls is ranked seventh. Primaries in small states rank the lowest 
by the criteria of minimizing presidential-congressional conflict. Nonpartisan pri 
maries in small states is slightly above partisan primaries in small states, the current 
method employed to select presidents and the worst option of those tested here by 
the executive-legislative conflict criteria. 
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Conclusion 
Interest group ratings of members of Congress were used to develop 
measures of conflict between simulated presidents and Congress. The data reveal 
significant differences on measures of liberalism and conservatism across parties in 
both the House and the Senate. Partisan differences exceed regional differences. 
Simulated presidents were generated under nine different presidential selection 
methods. The ideologies of the simulated presidents as measured by ten different 
interest group ratings were compared with the same ten interest group ratings for 
all members of the 101st Congress. Sensitivity tests were conducted under various 
conditions to generate measures of conflict between the simulated presidents and 
Congress. 
This analysis revealed that the current method of selecting presidents which 
sequences partisan contests in small non-representative states first in the selection 
process results in the greatest conflict between president and Congress. Thus the 
current selection method may be an additional explanation for the "deadlock of 
democracy." 
In general, partially as a result of the significant partisan cleavages in Congress, 
nonpartisan selection methods using large geographic heterogenous constituencies 
resulted in less presidential-congressional conflict than their partisan counterpart 
selection methods. But certain partisan methods, especially for the Democrats, re 
sulted in significant improvements over the current method of sequencing small 
states first. In particular, moving to sequence large states first would result in moderate 
improvements for Democrats and Republicans over the current sequencing of small 
states first. More sweeping changes result in even larger reductions in conflict. Thus, 
this analysis suggests that to reduce executive-legislative conflict we do not have to 
abolish the presidency as parliamentary advocates contend, but rather alter the method 
by which we pick presidents. 
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